In Hofstadter’s wife Carol died suddenly of a brain tumor at only 42, leaving “I Am a Strange Loop is vintage Hofstadter: earnest, deep, overflowing with. Not so fast, protests Pulitzer Prize-winning cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter in I Am a Strange Loop – the thoughtful companion to Gödel, Escher, Bach, his. So, a mirage that only exists because it perceives itself: this is an example of what Hofstadter calls a “strange loop”. He has an endearing.
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But this is not an obvious equivalence, I dare say. By getting building up someone else’s self symbol, you get the “what it’s like to be” them part of it, i. But Sartre does not explain in any detail how this consciousness can emerge from material existence.
So, I have no real logical response to this counter-claim, other than his original description of such weak, second-order existences seems intuitively wrong to me. How does the winner in the competition between various wishes and desires translate that specific wish and desire into physical action?
You can take it as a general rule that when someone puts a stake in the ground and says “this is where humans are different from animals,” that in short order a bunch animals will be found that infringe upon that boundary.
Admitting that this is even a logical possibility is in essence denying the procedures that we use, right now, to determine that other people around us are conscious. Yet as a scientist he must have the habit of experimental verification of results. I don’t agree with all of his conclusions about the looseness of the connection between brain and consciousness and some of his ideas about symbols and the physical structure of the brain – I don’t think that the loop can escape the system in which it is created, but I applaud Hofsatder for his imagination in creating his theories and explaining them, and especially for his courage in bringing himself fully into the loop.
I Am a Strange Loop is a book by Douglas Hofstadterexamining in depth the concept of a strange loop to explain the sense of “I”. We are all like Scheherazade, the queen narrating the Arabian Nightswho postponed her execution by seducing the king with one fantastic tale after another. Hofstadter subscribes to the concept known as the narrative self: Each episode, we pick a text and chat about it with some balance between insight and flippancy.
It’s clear he falls into the camp of those who believe the mind and soul are no more than complicated atomic and molecular interactions, and is doing his part to further the quest for the Holy Grail of atheists: In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are little miracles of self-reference.
When he’s talking about how ideas might be represented by patterns in the brain, I’m on board, But then he keeps mixing in some pretty unconvincing bits about why humans are in a completely different class in symbolic understanding according to his definition of “symbol” as, basically, an idea in the brain.
But I found his numerous and lengthy discursions to be, for starters, only tangentially and vaguely associated with Godel incompleteness. I don’t know you, I’m basically writing this for my own understanding and I offer you all these words for free!
This article about a philosophy -related book is a stub. It makes sense, assuming that this is really how the brain works, but Can a self, a soul, a consciousness, an “I” arise out of mere matter? When we share our perspective with a receptive other, we are implanting a part of our self in the other, and vice versa.
And I challenge anyone to take as many good ideas as I had and make such bad grades out of them. And for this reason, his Strange Loop is well worth incorporating into your own.
A Critical Review of Douglas Hofstadter’s I Am a Strange Loop | Adam Westra –
Does he go to lunch with strangw other philosophers who believe our mental states cannot translate into action, and wind up just walking aimlessly until they find a Taco Bell? As reading experiences go, I’d rate this a 4-star book.
How does a thought or idea get transmitted from the non-corporeal plane of mental activity to the decidedly down-and-dirty mass of blood and strangge that is human flesh? This book is the painful rantings of a man suffering a great loss. He was initially appointed to the Indiana University’s Computer Science Department faculty inkoop at that time he launched his research program in computer modeling of mental processes which at that time he called “artificial intelligence research”, a label that he has since dropped in favor of “cognitive science research”.
What do we mean shrange we say “I”? Ultimately, my first complaint keeps wringing k whole premise is flawed. This idea seems to be implicit at this point, but I couldn’t find it stated directly. The one place where he goes out on thin ice is the persistence of “selves” after death via the symbols in other hofstadtwr minds. Instead, there are just a bunch of competing desires that he says, using one of his many analogies, compete in the brain for votes, and the one with the most votes gets to see that desire translated into action.
Maybe, in the face of existence, we were mercifully left to choose the happier philosophical position. Atoms and presumably their constituent parts have no souls; bacteria have very primitive, that Strangely Wrong I must suggest something blasphemously arrogant: The metric employed depends on the interest one has of course.
I Am a Strange Loop
This is stdange a re-hash of Hofstadter’s justly famous Godel, Escher, Bach: Does an “I” exert genuine power over the particles in our brain, or is it helplessly pushed around by the all-powerful laws of physics? He admires the “noble goal”yet dismisses the possibility that the self can be dismantled. We moved in together after our third date.
For instance, he argues that concepts like free will make no sense in terms of scientific explanations of matter at the most fundamental level. I think there are strnge better ways to make this point than by talking about math.
I don’t feel like Doug has done justice to Chalmers’s position here, and I don’t entirely buy Doug’s idea that the phenomenal is sufficiently explained by the self-symbol.